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ABSTRACT 
 
    China’s A-share market and B-share market are initiated for Chinese domestic investors and 
foreign investors respectively. With the identical issuing companies, trading rules, voting rights 
and dividends policies, B shares have been selling at a discount relative to A-share counterparts, 
which is considered as a puzzle over years. This thesis emphasizes the importance of the 
ownership structures on the price disequilibrium, especially, the individual-institutional structure 
and tradable-nontradable structure in China. By building up a multi-regression model, the A-
share premium (or B-share discount) can be explained by the different ownership structures 
between the two markets. More specifically, the results show that in Chinese stock markets  
institutional investors help to stabilize the stock prices; the results also indicate that non-tradable 
shares limit the liquidity level of Chinese stock markets. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Problem: Apparent Disequilibrium between Two Stock Markets in China 
 
    The fast growing Chinese capital markets have received a great deal of attention in recent 
years. China’s stock markets have experienced tremendous growth and development since the 
establishment of the two stock exchanges—Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1990, which formed the “A-share” market. Two years later, Chinese 
securities markets opened a door to foreign investors and created the “B-share” market in both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. Initially, to avoid global capital shocks and to protect state-owned 
assets, domestic investors and foreign investors were separated perfectly into A-share and B-
share markets respectively. After the reforms were implemented in 2001, domestic Chinese retail 
investors have been allowed to trade in B-share market. With the identical issuing companies, 
trading rules, voting rights and dividends policies as A shares, B shares have been selling at 
discount relative to A-share counterparts, which is considered as a puzzle and has attracted the 
interest of numerous researchers.  
    Some works have been done to analyze the possible explanations to this phenomenon. Bailey 
(1994) studies and documents the behavior of B-share returns since the market just established. 
He emphasizes the relationship between B-share returns and international stock index returns to 
analyze the diversification value of B shares. The results demonstrate that B shares have 
considerable diversification value, which could be one of the factors that B shares selling at a 
cheaper price than A-share counterparts.  Bailey continued his study on international asset 
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pricing, especially the Chinese stock markets disequilibrium in his “Foreign Ownership 
Restrictions and Equity Price Premiums: What Drives the Demand for Cross-Border 
Investments?” (1999). In this paper, he and the other researchers explain the large price premium 
by the concepts focusing on foreign investor’s demand and supply of shares. Ma (1996) finds 
that the price difference between Chinese A shares and matching B shares is correlated with 
investors’ attitudes toward risk and the correlations between B shares and foreign shares.  Sun 
and Tong (1999) test mainly the differential demand argument and several other factors about 
information, liquidity and speculation. They find that the B-share discount phenomenon is due to 
demand elasticity differences. More specifically, B-share investors are facing a more elastic 
demand curve than A-share investors because B shares have more substitutes. Chakravarty, 
Sarkar and Wu (1998) argue that one reason for the large price discount of B shares is due to 
market segmentation and information asymmetry. The empirical study suggests that foreign 
investors have less information on Chinese capital markets.  Gao (2001) investigates the 
behaviors of the investors in A-share and B-share markets. Gao documents that A-share investors 
have internal news in advance of the public disclosure, which is one reason for the 
disequilibrium. In another study about information asymmetry, however, Chui and Kwok (2001) 
find empirical evidence showing that the information flow is actually from B-share market to A-
share market, meaning foreign investors receive news faster than domestic investors due to 
information barriers in China. To support and extend Sun and Tong’s (1999) concept centering 
on the demand elasticity difference, Yang (2005) proves that the number and trading volume of 
Chinese firms traded in the U.S. are also related to the large price premium in A-share market 
than B-share market. In other words, the shares listed in the U.S. stock markets are another 
substitute for B shares. 
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Figure 1-1 Comparison of A-Share Price and B-Share Price (Price Indices of 85 stocks in A-
share market and B-share market, 1992-2011) 
1
 
 
1.2. Objectives of Research 
 
    To further analyze the causes of the pricing disequilibrium, it is necessary to dig into the core 
of the problem and study the structure of Chinese capital markets and its influence on the price 
differences.  The special ownership structure in China may significantly influence the price 
differences between A shares and B shares.  
    The general objective of this study is to examine how the ownership structure in China’s stock 
markets has affected the price gap between the two markets. The ownership structure in this 
paper indicates two classes of shares: tradable shares and non-tradable shares; institutional shares 
                                                          
1
 The Price indices are created by weighted cross-listed stocks in A-share market and B-share market 
from 1992 to 2011. In the graph the two price lines are not perfectly parallel, which indicates that there 
are different factors working on the price differences and changing over time. And A-share price is 
always higher than B-share price. 
4 
 
4 
 
and individual shares. Tradable shares in China defined as shares that are currently listed and 
available for public trading, which are called “float” in other countries. And nontradable shares 
or restricted nontradable shares in China are calculated by subtracting tradable shares from 
shares outstanding. The nontradable shares in China are distinguished from the restricted shares 
in other countries. For restricted shares in other countries, their dates to become tradable in open 
markets are known in advance. However, the timetable for nontradable shares in China to 
become liquid is not specified and it is all based on the government’s policy. 
    The specific objectives in sequential order are to: 
    1. Describe the price disequilibrium and analyze the causes centering on the ownership 
structure of China’s stock markets; 
    2. Review the historic development of Chinese capital markets during the period of 1992 to 
2011, and summarize the characteristics of A-share and B-share markets; 
    3. Examine the ownership structure factors that cause the phenomenon using data during the 
period 2001-2011 (due to the discontinuity of the price series since 2001). 
    This thesis emphasizes the importance of the ownership structures in China on the price 
disequilibrium, especially, the individual-institutional structure and tradable-nontradable 
structure. The main questions are: Are individual investors considered to be more irrational and 
less informed? Will a higher proportion of individual investors over institutional investors lead a 
higher price away from the stocks’ fundamental values? As for capital control, do more shares 
tradable mean that more shares add liquidity to the market? And will a higher proportion of non-
tradable shares in the market limit the liquidity and lead to mispricing of the stocks? In this 
thesis, I will investigate the causes of price difference from the ownership structure aspect. I will 
be analyzing a 10-year quarterly panel data from 2001 to 2010 over the 85 cross-listing stocks in 
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A- and B-share markets. Other factors considered in prior research such as differential demand, 
liquidity and speculation will also be included in the model for control purpose. 
 
1.3. Thesis Organization 
  
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In order to understand disequilibrium in the 
Chinese stock markets, we must understand what comprise equilibrium. Capital asset pricing is 
discussed in Chapter 2 and then used to discuss the possible causes of disequilibrium in Chapter 
3 (literature review). Chapter 4 summarizes the data and methodology. Chapter 5 provides an 
overview of Chinese capital markets and comparison of A-share and B-share markets; lays out 
the model and analyzes the econometric results. Chapter 6 concludes the paper with a summary 
of results and discussion of implications. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CAPITAL ASSET PRICING 
 
2.1. Law of One Price 
 
    The law of one price is an economic law stated as “In an efficient market, all identical goods 
must have only one price.” For example, an ounce of gold should cost the same in commodity 
exchanges in Chicago and London. If the gold costs more in one exchange than the other, then 
traders would have incentive to arbitrage. Another example is exchange rate (e.g., the spot 
exchange rates for a currency in everywhere in the world markets must trade at the same price). 
   A cross-listed company is a firm that lists its equity shares on one or more stock exchanges. 
According to the law of one price, the prices of cross-listed shares should be the same in 
different stock exchanges. For example, numerous large Canadian companies are listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ as well as the Toronto Stock Exchange. The cross-
border put-call parity holds well in the two countries. In other words, the prices of the domestic 
market and foreign market are identical. Likewise, in China shares of identical company trading 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets should have the same price under the law of one price.  
 
2.2. Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
 
    APT holds that the expected return of a financial asset can be modeled as a linear function of 
various macro- economic variables (Ross, 1980). If the price diverges, arbitrage should bring it 
back into line. And it can be expressed as: 
   =    +       +       + ∙ ∙ ∙ +       +    
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    Where    is a constant;     is a factor;     is the sensitivity of the asset to factor k; and    is 
residual. And it can be rewritten in expected returns form as: 
      =    +        +         + ∙ ∙ ∙ +        
    Where     is the risk premium of the factor k;   is the risk-free rate. 
    A special case of APT is CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) in which the expected return is 
defined by a single index, measured against the return of a well-diversified market portfolio.  
      =    +      
    The assumptions of CAPM are: all investors are rational and risk-averse; are price takers; can 
lend and borrow unlimited amounts under risk free rate of interest; trade without transaction or 
taxation costs; receive the same information at the same time. APT has more flexible assumption 
requirements. It assumes that each investor will hold a unique portfolio with its own particular 
array of betas, as opposed to the identical "market portfolio" in CAPM. 
    Under capital asset pricing theories, arbitrage works when the current price of an asset 
diverges from the price predicted by the above model. Arbitragers will “sell high and buy low” 
till the market price comes back on the line. One inference from equilibrium models is that if two 
or more shares of identical asset and influenced by the same asset, then by CAPM or APT they 
should obtain the same price. However, this is not the case in China. Thus, here comes the 
question: how can an arbitrage opportunity exist and persist in Chinese equity markets? And why 
can’t arbitrage as predicted by capital asset pricing models close the gap? The price difference 
between Chinese A-share and B-share markets counterparts is because of mispricing or a risk 
compensation? Or the theory does not apply due to violation of its assumptions. 
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2.3. Assumptions of market equilibrium 
 
    Economists generally assume that the law of one price applies in liquid and efficient markets, 
which means that the markets should be extreme liquid; the prices reflect all the information in 
the markets; and there are no transaction costs and trade barriers. China’s capital markets are still 
during its developing period and market inefficiency exists. China’s abnormal phenomenon of 
A-share premium (or B-share discount) may have something to do with its going against the 
assumptions of the one price theory. Chinese stock markets violate the assumptions from the 
following aspects: 
 
    (a) Liquidity 
    The liquidity of A-share market and B-share market are much different—size, trading volume, 
turnover rate, and number of listed companies in A-share market is much larger than that of B 
shares. More specifically, A-share market is about 40 times larger than B-share market by total 
value of tradable stocks. And the turnover rate of A-share market is approximately 3 times higher 
than that of B-share market. As such, less liquidity of B-share market could be one of the reasons 
for B-share discount. In order to compensate for the investors, illiquid shares are required to have 
higher expected return and hence lower price.  
 
    (b) Market efficiency 
    The Chinese stock markets consist of tradable shares and non-tradable shares. The tradable 
shares or free float are the shares that are listed and traded in the exchange. The restricted 
nontradable shares or nontradable shares are shares owned by the government and cannot be 
traded in the stock markets. Nontradable shares are calculated by subtracting float from shares 
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outstanding. The original justification for the creation of nontradable shares was to ensure that 
state-owned enterprises would not fall into private or foreign hands. By locking up about 20% of 
shares outstanding in A-share market, non-tradable shares have strongly impacted market 
transparency. B shares, on the contrary, are almost all tradable shares. From historical data, A 
shares are more volatile than B shares, representing their price fluctuation risk. Therefore, it 
makes sense if investors in A-share market require a larger price premium to compensate higher 
price volatility. 
    Another issue about market efficiency is that short-selling is not allowed in mainland China. 
Economists believe that banning on short-selling delays price adjustment to the correct value and 
reduce market efficiency. If a stock is overvalued, then a good way to correct this overvaluation 
is to sell the stock short. The existence of the tremendous price difference between A-share and 
B-share market may due to banning on short-selling in mainland China. 
 
    (c) Information asymmetry 
    The finance literature documents that the information asymmetry exits between A-and B-share 
markets. Chakravarty, Sarkar, Wu (1998) argue that one reason for the large price discount of B 
shares is because foreign investors have less information on Chinese stock markets than 
domestic investors. However, Chui, Kwok (2001) document that foreign investors receive news 
faster than domestic investors due to information barriers in China; as a result, the returns on B 
shares should lead the returns on A shares. 
    Another level of information asymmetry is between institutional investors and retail investors. 
Institutions generally tend to be banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, 
investment trusts and hedge funds. They are a very special group of investors because of the size 
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of assets that they manage and amount of information and experience they have and use on stock 
selection. Compared to institutional investors, retail investors are more irrational and less 
experienced in general. The speculative activities of retail investors may then increase the 
volatility of stock prices.  
    Given the inefficient features of Chinese stock markets, this paper will find the relationship 
between substantial price differences and market inefficiency, especially, from ownership 
structures (tradable-nontradable structure and individual-institutional structure) aspect. And next 
chapter will summary the possible causes of the price disequilibrium based on previous studies. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
POSSIBLE CAUSES OF DISEQUILIBRIUM (LITERATURE REVIEW) 
 
   As discussed in the previous chapters, financial economists believe that the equilibrium 
conditions in which the same quality stocks in two markets should obtain the exact same price. 
Unlikely, there exists a large price discount for B shares relative to the A shares in China. Given 
substantial price differences between the two classes of shares, a number of researchers provide 
their explanations and perform empirical tests based on their hypotheses. There are four 
hypotheses on the A-share price premium (or B-share discount): differential demand hypothesis, 
information asymmetry hypothesis, liquidity hypothesis, and speculation hypothesis/ differential 
risk hypothesis. I will include a few of factors that in prior research into my model. And at the 
same time, I will test several new variables from the aspect of ownership structures. 
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
 
(a) Liquidity hypothesis 
    In the liquidity hypothesis, the price gap between A shares and the matching B shares is 
explained as the differential liquidity levels between the two markets. As empirical proxies for 
liquidity measurement, trading volume and turnover rate
2
 are mostly used. According to the 
previous studies, A-share market is more liquid than B-share market, which drives B-share price 
lower than A-share price to compensate for illiquidity. Bailey (1994) documents that differential 
liquidity levels may explain the time-series and cross-sectional variation of the price difference. 
Sun and Tong (1999) find a positive relationship between the trading volume ratio (B shares over 
                                                          
2
 The turnover rate in this paper means the average daily volume. 
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A shares) and the B-share discount, which suggests that relatively less trading activity in B-share 
market than A-share market drives the price gap larger. Based on the results of previous studies, 
if I use turnover rate ratio or trading volume ratio (A shares over B shares) as an independent 
variable and A-share premium as dependent variable, the coefficient between the two should be 
positive. 
 
    (b) Asymmetric information hypothesis 
    Researchers under this topic mainly test which market has more information over the other. 
Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998) argue that the discount in B-share market is due to foreign 
investors’ lack of information relative to domestic investors. They argue that difficulties of 
gaining information are due to language barriers, different accounting standards and lack of 
knowledge about the local economy. They develop a model focusing on information asymmetry 
and market segmentation, and derive a pricing equation for A shares and B shares. The results 
show that information asymmetry explains a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation 
of the B-share discounts. However, Chui and Kwok (2001) argue and prove with empirical 
evidence that the information flow is from B share market to A share market, which is right 
opposite of what Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998) found. They argue that the returns on B 
shares should lead the returns on A shares, and this pattern of information flow is due to the 
segmentation in the China’s capital markets and China’s information barriers. 
 
    (c) Differential demand hypothesis 
    According to differential demand argument, researchers mainly focus on the share supply 
(shares outstanding) and demand elasticity (substitutes for A shares and B shares), and their 
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influence on the stock prices. Under differential demand hypothesis, the demand elasticity of 
domestic investors is relatively lower than that of foreign investors. As a result, A-share 
investors would like to pay a higher price for the same stocks than B-share investors. Sun and 
Tong (1999) argue that the China’s B-share discount phenomenon is due to foreign investors 
facing a more elastic demand curve than Chinese domestic investors. They state that B shares 
have more substitutes than A shares, which makes the demand curve of B shares more elastic. 
The result shows that when more H shares and red chips listed in Hong Kong (which they 
believe are the substitutes of B shares), the B-share discount becomes larger. As an empirical 
proxy for relative demand of share; I use the ratio of number of shareholders in A-share market 
to B-share market. And as a possible proxy for relative share supply, I use the ratio of number of 
shares outstanding in A-share market to B-share market. Theoretically, the price premium of A 
shares over B shares should be negatively related with share supply ratio and positively related 
with share demand ratio according to demand-supply equations. 
 
    (d) Differential risk hypothesis/Speculation hypothesis 
     For differential risk argument, researchers study the differential risk aversions of A 
shareholders and B shareholders. The hypothesis argues that Chinese domestic investors are 
highly speculative, which drives the A-share price much higher than B-share price. Ma (1996) 
documents that “cross-sectional differences between prices of A shares and B shares are 
correlated with investors' attitudes toward risk and correlations between B shares and foreign 
shares”. Sun and Tong (1999) conclude that “the higher of the A-share market volatility relative 
to the B-share market volatility the larger B-share discount will be”. That means Chinese 
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domestic investors excessive speculative activities on A shares seem to be related to the A-share 
price premium. 
 
3.2. Additional Considerations 
 
    Among prior studies, few of them focus on ownership structures of China’s capital markets. 
However, stock market structure greatly affects share prices because different investors have 
different behaviors working on the stock prices. I add individual-institutional structure and 
tradable-nontradable structure variables into the model. And ownership structure is not totally 
segregated from the four arguments of disequilibrium (liquidity, demand elasticity, information 
asymmetry and risk aversion level). The following studies document how tradable-nontradable 
structure and individual-institutional structure work on stock prices. 
    
    (a) Individual investors vs. institutional investors 
    Sias (1996) states that, from academic point of view, institutional investors are more likely 
attracted by less-risky stocks because of several reasons: (1) many institutional investors are 
governed by more strict rules, thus they are more cautious and conservative when picking their 
stocks, (2) greater institutional ownership may gather more information, and (3) institutional 
investors tend to be more rational than individual investors.  
    Gompers and Metrick (1999) find that institutions have different behaviors when choosing 
stocks compared with the other investors: institutions invest in stocks that are larger, more liquid, 
and with relatively lower returns. What’s more, their demands in certain stocks are stable over 
time. Given this stable demand for stocks, a shift of investment from individuals to institutions 
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implies changes in the buying behaviors. In other words, an increase in the institutional share of 
the market will result in a greater demand for large, liquid and low return stocks. 
    In Gompers and Metrick’s (1999) paper, they argue that “investors would prefer liquid assets 
over illiquid ones and would be willing to give up some amount of expected future cash flows to 
buy more liquidity, especially institutional investors”. Except for facing a stricter legal 
environment and being more sensitive to liquidity and transaction cost, the reason why 
institutional investors are so different is that they have better knowledge about historical return 
patterns and believe that the rate of return for any stock must in relation to its risk class. 
    Cohen (2002) provides empirical evidence on the stabilizing impact of institutions. Institutions 
buy shares from individuals in response to positive cash-flow news. And when stock price goes 
up without any positive news, institutions sell shares to individuals. Barber and Odean (2003) 
find that individual investors display “attention-based” buying behavior on days with high 
trading activities. In contrast, institutional investors do not show this buying behavior.  
    Bohl and Brzeszczynski (2005) argue that if institutional herds all react to the same news, it 
will help with the adjustment of stock prices to new information faster and thus make the stock 
market more efficient. In other words, institutional investors may stabilize stock prices and help 
the stock prices move towards their fundamental values. Thus, the more shares held by 
institutional investors, the more the stock prices reflect the firms’ true values. Liu and Han 
(2010) also find that large shareholder trades will incorporate more information about the firm's 
prospects and push prices towards their fundamental value. 
    However, a number of studies document that institutional investors have negative herding 
effect on stock markets. Some researchers argue that instead of stabilizing asset prices as 
suggested by much of the academic literature, institutional investors cause volatility because they 
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are actually associated with riskier stocks. Sias (1996) find evidence that an increase in relative 
institutional holdings drives an increase in volatility. Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou and Stanley 
(2006) present a theory of excess stock market volatility, in which market movements are due to 
large institutional trading in relatively illiquid markets. And such trades generate significant 
extreme values in returns and volume. 
 
(b) Tradable shares vs. nontradable shares 
    As discussed in previous chapters, the Chinese government opened stock exchanges in the 
early 1990s to raise capital and improve the performance of state-owned firms. To ensure 
government’s control of state-owned firms, nontradable shares were created and took up about 
20% of China’s stock markets. And as described before, tradable shares in this thesis mean the 
free float in the market; and nontradable shares are the restricted shares that cannot be traded in 
the stock exchanges. Chen and Xiong (2002) find that the non-tradable state-owned shares and 
legal-person shares in China have an average illiquidity discount about 70% to 80% when they 
are traded over the counter. 
    Beltratti and Bortolotti (2006) document some negative effects of non-tradable shares on the 
stock markets and stock prices. First, the tradable shares investors are typically minority 
shareholders with little power to affect management decisions. Second, the limited free float 
available due to the existence of non-tradable shares makes the stock markets illiquid, volatile 
and speculative. Thus, by changing tradable and non-tradable structure (unlocking non-tradable 
shares and increasing tradable shares) the market would expect better liquidity given the 
substantial increase in the free float. Moreover, the increase in the percentage of tradable shares 
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will put a downward pressure on the market, which will pull the A-share prices close to B-share 
prices. 
    According to studies on tradable and nontradable shares and individual and institutional 
shares, I believe that those two structures will have some influence on the A-share premium in 
China. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Data 
 
    This chapter describes the data and illustrates the methodology used to test and analyze 
possible factors of the price disequilibrium phenomenon in China. By the end of 2010, there 
were 1339 firms listed in A-share market and 108 firms listed in B-share market. Meanwhile, 85 
firms are listed in both A- and B-share markets. To analyze the price differences between the two 
markets and its possible factors; I only include firms that have listed in both A- and B-share 
markets into my data sample. Therefore, I use quarterly data of those 85 stocks from December 
2001 to December 2010 to perform a panel data analysis
3
. I choose 2001 as the start year is 
because after the reform in 2001 domestic retail investors have been able to invest in B-share 
market, which was seen as a turning point of the markets. The sources of the data include Resset 
Database, Bloomberg, Datastream and Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
websites. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
4.2.2. Panel Data Analysis 
 
                                                          
3
 the companies are showed in Appendix A and Appendix B 
19 
 
19 
 
    A panel is a cross-section over a given time span. The combination of time-series with cross-
sections can enhance the quality and quantity of data. Fixed effects panel model is one type of 
model that built with panel data.  
    If both time and cross-section factors are used as dummy variables, the slope coefficients are 
constant, but the intercept will vary over sections as well as time. For example, there are m 
different sections and n different years in the panel data. And then the model could be specified 
as follows: 
     =    +            +            +∙ ∙ ∙+                
+    +         +        +∙ ∙ ∙+             
+        +         +∙ ∙ ∙+        +      
    This model is the basic model of this thesis. 
 
4.2.3. Model 
 
    I perform a panel data analysis, which was also used by Domowitz et al. (1997), and Sun and 
Tong (1999). My regression model is as follows: 
 
           =               +             +        +           +          +               
+             
+           +           +∙ ∙ ∙+            
+       +       +∙ ∙ ∙+          
+       +       +∙ ∙ ∙+        +  +         i=1  2 …  N; t=1 2 … T  
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    Where             is A-share price premium divided by B-share price;               is the 
ratio of volatility (in A-share market over that in B-share market);             is the ratio of 
turnover rate;        is number of shares outstanding;           is ratio of percentage of tradable 
shares;          is ratio of number of shareholders (in logarithm);              is ratio of 
institutional holdings (in logarithm);           ,           ,       ,       are dummy 
variables representing stock exchange, industry category, individual firm and year respectively 
(      is the "time factor" and       is the "cross-section" factor;    is the sensitivity of the 
asset to factor k; and    is residual with a mean of zero. 
 
4.3. Description of Variables 
 
    The dependent variable in the model is “apremium”, which is the A-share premium defined as 
(  -  )/  , where   and    are quarterly-end prices of A and B shares. A shares are all traded in 
Chinese Renminbi. B shares listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange are traded in U.S. dollars (USD), 
while those listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange are traded in Hong Kong dollars (HKD). To 
unify the prices and calculate “apremium”, all the prices are converted into USD by using 
quarterly-end exchange rates. Most of the time A shares are more expensive than their 
counterparts in B-share market; as a result, “apremium” are almost all positive in the sample 
data. I assume       has a zero mean and is uncorrelated with dependent variables. 
    There are six numerical independent variables in the model. There are all in the form of ratios 
(A-share market over B-share market). Two variables represent the two ownership structures that 
may cause the price difference between A shares and matching B shares—the percentage of 
tradable shares (“trdpct”) and institutional holdings (“lninshold); two are proxies to capture the 
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differential demand factors—number of shares outstanding (“lnshn”) and number of shareholders 
(“nsh”); the other two are indicators of the market general features—market volatility 
(“volatility”) and turnover rate4 (“turnover”). 
 
    (a) Proxies to test ownership structure influences 
    “trdpct” and “lninshold” are the two main variables in the model, representing two classes of 
ownership structures in China’s stock markets. Those variables are to test the hypothesis about 
the influence of ownership structures in China's stock markets on the price disequilibrium. 
“trdpct” is the ratio of percentage of tradable shares in A-share market over tradable shares in B-
share market.
5
 Tradable shares are shares that can be traded in the stock exchanges and are the 
real share supply in the market. On the opposite, non-tradable shares are shares that held by the 
Chinese government or organizations that backed by the government and cannot be traded in the 
stock exchanges. And most of the non-tradable shares are represented by state-owned shares or 
legal-person shares. Non-tradable shares are an unparalleled feature of the ownership structure of 
Chinese listed companies (Beltratti and Bortolotti, 2006). The existence of non-tradable shares 
extremely limits free float available and makes the markets illiquid, volatile and speculative. The 
more shares are not tradable, the less the free float will be available in the market, and the higher 
stock prices will be. As for variable “trdpct” (ratio of tradable shares percentage in A-share 
market to B-share market), the higher the ratio is, the higher the A-share premium will be. Thus, 
the null hypothesis on “trdpct” is there is no relationship between the percentage of tradable 
shares and A-share premium. If tradable and non-tradable share structure is one important factor 
of the price differences, “trdpct” should be negatively related to “apremium” (A-share premium). 
                                                          
4
 The turnover rate in this thesis means the daily average volume 
5
 The tradable A shares increase over time from 60% in 2005 of the market to about 90% of the market 
today. B shares are almost all tradable in the market.  
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    Another possible factor of ownership structure on the price difference is “lninshold”, which 
represents the relative institutional holdings (number of shares owned by institutional investors) 
between A shares and B shares. As a very important group of investors, institutional investors 
are considered to be more informed and experienced, and thus help to stabilize asset prices as 
suggested by most of academic literature. However, there is a number of studies show that 
institutional investors are associated with more volatile stocks. “Herding and positive feedback 
trading are the two main arguments put forward for the destabilizing impact on stock prices 
induced by institutional investors.” (Bohl and Brzeszczynski, 2006) To test the relationship 
between institutional ownership and the price difference, the null hypothesis is that there is no 
relationship between the ratio of relative institutional holdings and the A-share premium. If 
institutional investors help with stock price stability, “lninshld” (ratio of institutional holdings) 
will be negatively related to “apremium” (A-share premium) because the more shares held by 
institutional investors the closer the stock price will come toward its fundamental value and the 
smaller the price gap will be. If institutional investors are associated with disability of the market, 
the estimate will be positive indicating that institutions prefer risker stocks and drive the price 
difference between the two markets larger. When checking the assumptions of the model, the 
residuals pattern of the institutional shares ratio is mostly scattered on the left hand side in the 
graphs, indicating a different residuals variance. Therefore, I use natural logarithm of this 
variable. The adjusted R square of the multi-regression is greatly improved after the 
transformation. 
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  (b) Proxies to test the differential demand argument 
    “lnshn” and “nsh” represent the share demand and share supply in the markets respectively. 
“nsh” is the ratio of the number of shares outstanding in A-share market over B-share market, 
which represents the relative share supply in the two markets. In Sun and Tong (1999), they use 
shares outstanding as the supply of the market to test whether the demand curve is downward 
sloping. And they get a negative sign in the result, which demonstrates that when the supply of A 
shares increases relative to the supply of B shares, price pressure would push A-share prices to 
drop relative to B-share prices. With the same expectation as Sun and Tong (1999), I expect that 
“nsh” (number of shares outstanding) will be negatively related with “apremium” (A-share price 
premium).  
    “lnshn” is the ratio of number of shareholders in A-share market to that of B-share market.  I 
use this variable as share demand in the model. Merton (1987) suggests that an increase in a 
firm's investor base increases the firm's value. Amihud, Mendelson and Uno (1999) find that a 
reduction in the minimum trading unit increases a firm's base of individual investors, and 
significantly increases stock liquidity and price. Further, the stock price appreciation drives an 
increase in the number of shareholders in return. To sum up, as a factor of share demand, the 
more investors in the market, the higher the prices will be. Thus, with the same expectation, the 
relationship between “lnshn” (number of shareholders) and “apremium” (A-share premium) 
should be positive. I use natural logarithm of this variable because of left-scattered residual 
pattern. The adjusted R square of the multi-regression is greatly improved after the 
transformation. 
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 (c) Proxies to test general factors 
    The model also includes some general variables—“volatility” and “turnover”, which are the 
ratio of volatility and turnover rate in the two market and representing relative speculative 
activities and liquidity levels. Sun and Tong (1999) test those two factors and find that they are 
significantly influence the price difference between the two markets. “volatility” is included in 
the model to test the speculative argument. It is calculated by the volatility of A shares divided 
by the volatility of B shares. Volatility is used to quantify the risk of the financial instrument 
over the specified time period. At the same time, the ratio of volatility is a way to capture the 
relative speculative activities of investors in the two markets: the excess of volatility of A shares 
over B shares can be explained by the relative excess of speculative activities. If A-share market 
is more speculative than B-share market, the relationship between “volatility” (ratio of volatility) 
and “apremium” (A-share price premium) should be positive. 
    “turnover” is the ratio of turnover rate (A shares over B shares). Turnover rate is a liquidity 
variable. And liquidity is viewed as a very important factor in many of previous studies. In Sun 
and Tong (1999), instead of using turnover rate as the liquidity proxy they use trading volume. 
As a ratio, “turnover” in the model is the indicator of relative liquidity levels between A- and B-
share markets. If the B-share discount is due to lack of liquidity of B-share market, the “turnover” 
(ratio of turnover rate) should be positively related to “apremium” (A-share premium). 
 
    (d) Firm, industry, stock exchange and time effects 
    Except for six numerical variables, there are four dummy variables in the model. “exchange” 
represents the stock exchanges.  There are two stock exchanges in mainland China—Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) is the world's 
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5th largest stock market by market capitalization at US$2.7 trillion as of Dec 2010.  Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE) is another stock exchange in mainland China. The exchange opened the 
a NASDAQ-type exchange high-tech start-ups in 2009. They are perfectly exclusive— one 
company cannot be listed in both stock exchanges. The reason that why I include this variable in 
the model is that the firms that listed in the two markets are quite different from each other. 
Specifically, the companies that listed in SSE are large-capital firms who have over 4 trillion 
capital stocks. On the contrary, the companies that listed in SZSE are usually much smaller with 
a capitalization of less than 1 trillion. 
    “industry” shows different industry categories and there are 7 types of industries associated in 
the data sample. Information Technology Industry, Manufacturing, Production & Supply of 
Power, Gas & Water, Real Estate, Social Services, Transportation & Storage, and Wholesale 
And Retail Trades. “firm” includes all the 85 individual firms. And it is the "cross-section factor". 
And “year” is the time factor in the model, which is from 20016 and 2010. I include this variable 
in the model because as showed in Figure 1-1, the price difference changes over time, which 
indicates time variance exists in the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The sample data start from December 2001, the year when the B-share market opened to domestic retail 
investors. In other words, the B-share market has been opened to both foreign investors and domestic 
retail investors since then. 
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Table 4-1 Summary statistics of the regression variables 
 
Year 
A-share 
price 
premium 
(%) Volatility 
Turnover 
ratio 
Number of 
shares 
outstanding 
Tradable 
shares 
percentage 
Number of 
shareholders 
(logarithm) 
Institutional 
holdings 
(logarithm) 
2001 7.9034412 0.687209302 5.585505618 2.43948 0.473 0.54199107 -1.95905773 
2002 8.8066957 0.848921569 22.94557214 2.50449 0.483 0.52439403 -1.63973177 
2003 8.65601 1.081878788 35.61286624 2.50988 0.488 0.46810194 -0.60857184 
2004 8.897913 1.091012146 38.02125 2.57972 0.497 0.43734334 -1.822444943 
2005 9.2796181 1.106492308 53.624 2.59548 0.507 0.59290029 -3.123882477 
2006 7.2204044 1.132302158 35.68102041 2.6738 0.773 0.63839914 0.877461922 
2007 6.6027655 1.118526316 36.28331915 2.80315 0.953 0.49287162 1.885575487 
2008 7.3897758 1.150343137 72.89940928 2.88612 0.975 0.57677051 1.825210075 
2009 8.4538934 1.227960526 74.27459877 3.01817 0.981 0.67849468 0.946580285 
Mean 8.1345019 1.049405139 41.65861573 2.66781 0.681 0.55014073 -0.402095666 
 
    From Table 4-1 we can see that the A-share price premium is about 8% of B-share price. The 
volatility of A-share market is a little bit higher than that of B-share market. The ratio of turnover 
rate changed tremendously from year to year, but A-share market is much more liquid than B-
share market. Number of shares outstanding in A-share market is about 2.5 times of number of 
shares outstanding in B-share market. Tradable shares in the markets increased greatly since 
2005 when the reform7 started. After taking logarithm of number of shareholders, the numbers 
are above zero, which indicates that the number of shareholders in A-share market is more than 
that in B-share market. And after taking logarithm of institutional shareholdings, the mean of 10 
years institutional holdings are higher in B-share market than that in A-share market. 
 
                                                          
7
 In 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission initiated the reform to transform non-tradable 
shares into tradable shares. The reform process has been working successfully—the percentage of non-
tradable shares (over total issued shares) is from 65% in 2005 to today’s 20%, which actually increased 
the shares supply and liquidity of the whole markets. The change can be seen from Table 1 that the 
percentage of tradable shares over shares outstanding has increased from 2007 to 2010 in A-share market. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MARKET OVERVIEW, MODEL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. The Chinese Capital Markets 
 
5.1.1. Historic Development of A-Share and B-Share Markets 
 
    After the Cultural Revolution ended, China was re-opened to the outside world in 1978. 
China's securities market has evolved and developed during the reforms in1980s. One of the 
significant events is to privatize state-owned companies and open the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
on December 19, 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on December 1, 1990.  
    To further develop stock market and attract foreign capital, the Chinese government opened B-
share market to foreign investors in 1992, which is separated from A-share market for Chinese 
domestic investors. And the segmentation of the two markets is to protect Chinese government 
interest and prevent negative international capital impact.  
    From historical data, there is always a tremendous price gap between the two markets. Starting 
from March 2001, aiming at stimulating the liquidity of B-share market, Chinese domestic retail 
investors are allowed to trade B shares. When this news broke out at the beginning of 2001, 
Chinese B share prices went up dramatically in a few weeks. And the price gap was narrowed 
thereafter, but still exits. 
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5.1.2. Overview of Chinese Stock Markets 
    
    The Chinese equity market is still at its early stage of development; and segmentation is one of 
its most dominating characteristics. In general, Chinese listed firms have two classes of shares 
outstanding: shares which are traded domestically in mainland China, including A-share and B-
share; and shares listed in overseas markets, such as H-share, N-share, S-share and T-share, 
representing shares issued in Hong Kong, the U.S, Singapore, and Japan markets. Segmentation 
further exists within the domestic shares—A shares are traded by domestic investors while B 
shares are denominated in foreign currencies and designated for foreign investors. 
    Another unparalleled feature of ownership structures in China is its tradable and non-tradable 
shares. Non-tradable shares typically belong to Chinese government or domestic financial 
institutions owned by the government. Non-tradable shareholders have exactly the same voting 
and dividends rights assigned to the holders of tradable shares but cannot be traded publicly 
(Beltratti and Bortolotti, 2006). 
     As it is showed in Table 5-1, there are currently 1,339 stocks listed in A-share market and 108 
stocks listed in B-share market. And there are 85 companies listed in both A-share and B-share 
markets. A shares are quoted in Chinese Renminbi, while B shares are quoted in foreign 
currencies (B Shares listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange are listed in US dollars and B Shares in 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange are listed in Hong Kong dollars). A-share market is open to Chinese 
domestic retail and institutional investors, while B-share market is open to foreign investors and 
Chinese domestic retail investors, not including domestic institutional investors. Except those 
difference mentioned above, the B shares and A-share counterparts are identical—they have the 
same voting rights, dividends and trading rules. 
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Table 5-1 Chinese Stock Market Overview 
 
  2010  2009  2008  2007  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Shanghai A share B share A share B share A share B share A share B share 
No. of Listings 884  54  860  54  854  54  850  54  
Issued Volume(billion) 21,810  130  16,536  124  15,289  121  14,058  115  
Market Value(billion) 178,000  1,007  183,800  855  96,875  377  268,497  1,342  
Trading Volume(billion) 25,812  152  33,477  203  16,207  104  23,931  394  
Deals Traded(million) 1,653  8  2,133  10  1,273  6  1,599  19  
Trading Value(billion) 303,216  1,096  345,443  1,069  179,762  668  301,960  3,474  
Tradable Volume(billion) 15,901  130  11,455  124  4,795  121  3,284  115  
Tradable Market Value(billion) 141,330  1,007  113,950  855  31,929  377  63,191  1,342  
Individual Investors(accounts) 75,555,733  -  69,108,156  -  60,883,646  1,453,400  54,468,593  1,422,000  
Institutional Investors(accounts) 307,508  -  290,514  -  262,770  11,885  250,615  3,030  
Total Accounts 75,863,241  -  69,398,670  -  61,146,416  1,465,285  54,719,208  1,425,030  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Shenzhen  A share B share A share B share A share B share A share B share 
No. of Listings 455  54  454  55  455  55  464  55  
Issued Volume(million) 292,888  14,995  270,110  14,916  230,362  13,846  210,445  12,817  
Market Value(million) 3,984,450  95,675  1,742,156  42,329  4,544,363  121,155  1,498,071  79,551  
Trading Volume(million) 1,385,000  25,517  651,628  11,426  1,093,697  32,584  538,756  17,695  
Deals Traded 918,307,700  8,189,763  527,046,338  4,412,890  741,164,554  12,077,341  243,983,287  4,877,318  
Trading Value(million) 13,834,451  102,872  6,949,071  55,472  13,663,734  231,094  2,890,045  68,029  
Tradable Volume(million) 206,616  14,794  161,652  14,702  124,909  13,549  100,343  11,879  
Tradable Market Value(million) 2,770,379  94,733  981,711  41,820  2,351,229  119,623  707,373  77,795  
Individual Investors(accounts) 74,668,041  -  68,169,084  -  59,865,636  926,700  53,244,974  899,900  
Institutional Investors(accounts) 267,548  -  250,044  -  223,358  11,500  203,487  10,400  
Total Accounts 74,935,589  -  68,419,128  -  60,088,994  938,200  53,448,461  910,300  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total  A share B share A share B share A share B share A share B share 
No. of Listings 1,339  108  1,314  109  1,309  109  1,314  109  
Issued Volume(billion) 22,103  145  16,807  138  15,520  135  14,268  128  
Market Value(billion) 181,984  1,103  185,542  898  101,420  498  269,995  1,421  
Trading Volume(billion) 27,197  178  34,128  214  17,301  137  24,470  412  
Deals Traded(million) 2,572  16  2,660  14  2,014  18  1,843  23  
Trading Value(billion) 317,050  1,199  352,392  1,124  193,426  899  304,850  3,542  
Tradable Volume(billion) 16,108  145  11,617  138  4,920  135  3,384  127  
Tradable Market Value(billion) 144,101  1,102  114,931  897  34,281  496  63,898  1,419  
Individual Investors(accounts) 150,223,774  -  137,277,240  -  120,749,282  2,380,100  107,713,567  2,321,900  
Institutional Investors(accounts) 575,056  -  540,558  -  486,128  23,385  454,102  13,430  
Total Accounts 150,798,830  -  137,817,798  -  121,235,410  2,403,485  108,167,669  2,335,330  
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    I collect the market information in Table 5-1 from “factbooks” 2007 to 2010 published on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange website and Shenzhen Stock Exchange website. The table shows two 
pairs of shares: A shares & B shares and shares listed in SSE & shares listed in SZSE. To 
compare A shares and B shares, I combine the shares in the two stock exchanges. As showed in 
the table, A-share market is much bigger than B-share market. There are about 10 times more 
companies listed in A-share market than B-share market. And the market value of A-share 
market is about 100 times of the market value of B-share market.  
    The ratio of trading volume in A-share market over B-share market is about 150, and the ratio 
of tradable volume in A-share market over B-share market is about 100. The difference between 
the two ratios is because about 80% of shares in A-share market are tradable shares; while almost 
all the shares in B-share market are tradable. The huge differences existing between the two 
markets in issued volume, market value, and trading volume further also suggest that A-share 
market is much bigger than B-share market. And Figure 5-1 shows the tremendous market size 
differences between the two markets. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Tradable Market Value and Market Value of A-Share and B-Share Markets 
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5.1.3. Foreign Investor Structure in B-Share Market 
 
   The B-share market is targeted by foreign investors all over the world. Researchers have been 
studying the diversification value of B shares to the world market. Table 5-2 shows the major 
investors of B shares around the world. And the top three investors (except mainland China) are 
from Hong Kong, United States and Taiwan. I, therefore, test the correlation between B shares 
index
8
 and foreign indices of markets of those places. SPX is the S&P 500 Index with the same 
time period as B shares price index. It is downloaded from Bloomberg. HIS is the Hang Seng 
Index, which is one of the earliest stock market indexes in Hong Kong. TWSE is the Taiwan 
Capitalization Weighted Stock Index, which is a stock market index for companies traded on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). SPGLOB is the S&P Global 1200 Index. It is a free-float 
weighted stock market index of global equities from Standard & Poor's. The index covers 31 
countries and approximately 70 percent of global stock market capitalization. 
    The correlations between B shares and the foreign indices are all positive. The result shows 
that B-share prices are highly correlated with Hong Kong stock prices and relatively less 
correlated with Taiwan stock prices. The correlation between B-share price and S&P Global 
1200 is 0.572, which means the diversification benefit of B shares is not very significant. 
 
Pearson correlation of B PI and SPX = 0.436 
P-Value = 0.000 
Pearson correlation of B PI and HIS = 0.803 
                                                          
8
 The B-share price index is created through Thompson Reuters Datastream. The B-share price index (“B 
PI”) is the B-share daily price index from February 2, 1992 to February 18, 2011, and is weighted average 
price by market value. 
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P-Value = 0.000 
Pearson correlation of B PI and TWSE = 0.360 
P-Value = 0.000 
Pearson correlation of B PI and SPGLOB = 0.572 
P-Value = 0.000 
 
Table 5-2 B-Share Investors Categories (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2010) 
 
 
5.1.4. Comparison between A-Share and B-Share Markets 
 
   To compare A-share and B-share markets in general, I created the Price Index through 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. I only pick the shares listed in both A- and B-share markets to 
create A- and B-share indices for comparison purpose. The cross-listing shares are altogether 85 
from year 1992 to 2011. And I focus on comparing the general market features between the two 
markets, including price difference, market sizes, and liquidity levels. 
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Figure 5-2 B-Share Discount as Percentage of A-Share Price 
 
 
Figure 5-3 Market Values of A-Share Market and B-Share Market 
    I calculate the B-share discount as a percentage of A-share price by using equation (  -  )/  . 
Figure 5-2 shows how the B-share discount was changing from 1992 to 2011. The numbers in 
the graph is below 0 in most years, meaning B shares have been selling at a discount compared 
to A-share counterparts. The graph also shows that the price difference changes over time, which 
indicates time variance is related to B-share discount. 
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    Figure 5-3 shows the comparison of market values between A-share market and B-share 
market. Market value in the graph is calculated by stock price × numbers of shares outstanding. 
From the graph, we can see that A-share market value is about 4 to 5 times of B-share market 
value. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Trading Volumes of A-Share Market and B-Share Market 
 
    Figure 5-4 shows for most of the time the trading volumes of A-share market are larger than 
trading volumes of B-share market (the ratios in the graph are mostly under 1). But it is not 
always the case—for a number of times B share market volume is much larger than that is of A-
share market, which are displayed as the spikes in the graph. 
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5.2. Model Results 
 
5.2.1. Model Selection and comparison 
 
Table 5-3 Models Selection (among Four Dummy Variables) 
 
Dummies Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 Model9 Model10 Model11 Model12 Model13 Model14 Model15 
volatility 2.6284* 2.5962* 2.6284* 0.2057 2.6284* 2.5962* 0.6306 0.3949 2.5962* 2.6284* 2.9991* 0.3315 2.5962* 0.6070 3.5236* 
turnover 0.0046* 0.0053* 0.0046* 0.0031** 0.0046* 0.0053* 0.0033* 0.0036* 0.0053* 0.0046* 0.0336* 0.0037* 0.0053* 0.0330* 0.0351* 
nsh
9
 0.3603* 0.4095* 0.3603* 0.0216 0.3603* 0.4095* -0.0291 0.1817** 0.4095* 0.3603* -0.0694 0.1034 0.0410* -0.1980 0.5091* 
trdpct
10
 -2.3619* -4.1329* -2.3619* 0.7858 -2.3619* -4.1329* -1.7113* 1.7252** -4.1329* -2.3619* 1.5016 -1.6296* -4.1329* -2.2792** 2.8000 
lnshn
11
 -1.8452* -1.7391* -1.8452* -1.7587* -1.8452* -1.7391* -1.6382* -1.7086* -1.7391* -1.8452* -4.7893* -1.5272* -1.7391* -4.6694* -4.7153* 
lninshold
12
 -0.0606** -0.0608** -0.0606** -0.1105* -0.0606** -0.0608** -0.1091* -0.1515* -0.0608** -0.0606** -0.2042* -0.1418* -0.0608** -0.1701* -0.2054* 
exchange ● ● ● ● 
 
● ● ● 
   
● 
   
firm ● ● ● 
 
● ● 
  
● ● 
  
● 
  
industry ● ● 
 
● ● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
  
● 
 
year ● 
 
● ● ● 
  
● 
 
● ● 
   
● 
                
adj R2 0.9332 0.9205 0.9332 0.8832 0.9332 0.9205 0.8747 0.8663 0.9205 0.9332 0.5611 0.8574 0.9205 0.5511 0.5139 
F 101.07 93.37 101.07 201.97 101.07 93.37 298.03 230.56 93.37 101.07 36.46 427.27 93.37 56.94 40.67 
MSE 1.9009 2.0726 1.9009 2.5128 1.9009 2.0726 2.602 2.6887 2.0726 1.9009 4.8705 2.7761 2.0726 4.9259 5.1259 
RSSp 1983.67 2396.98 1983.67 3876.9 1983.67 2396.98 4217.9 4482.07 2396.98 1983.67 14589.1 4847.63 2396.98 15140.98 16316.83 
P 111 102 104 26 109 95 17 19 100 102 24 10 93 15 17 
Cp 
1154.543 1353.971 1140.543 1980.508 1150.543 1339.971 2141.896 2284.867 1349.971 1136.543 7611.84 2459.176232 1335.971 7884.164 8506.739 
 
    Table 5-3 shows the model efficiency of models with different combinations of dummy 
variables. By calculating Mallow’s Cp13, Model 10, in which dummy variables “firm” and “year” 
are being used, is the best model among all the models tested. And Model 1, which includes all 
                                                          
9
 “nsh” is the ratio of number of shares outstanding. 
10
 “trdpct” is the ratio of tradable shares.  
11
 “lnshn” is the ratio of number of shareholders (in logarithm). 
12
 “lninshold” is the ratio of institutional holdings (in logarithm). 
* is a 5% significance level 
** is a 10% significance level 
13
 It is applied in the context of model selection  where      is the error sum of 
squares; P are regressors. 
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four dummy variables as my hypothsis described, is extremely efficient as well. With no big 
difference from Model 10, I choose Model 1 as my final model. All the results analysis in the 
following paragraphs are based on this model. 
 
Table 5-4  Model Comparison14 (Final Model vs. Model without transformation vs. model 
without new variables) 
     
 
Final model 
model w/o 
transformation model w/o new variables 
volatility 2.6284* -0.7467 0.9540** 
turnover 0.0046* 0.0061* 0.0054* 
nsh
15
 0.3603* -0.0344 0.2278 
trdpct
16
 -2.3619* -5.0130* 
 lnshn
17
 -1.8452* 
 
-1.417* 
lninshold
18
 -0.0606** 
  shn
19
 
 
0.0003 
 inshold
20
 
 
0.0009 
 
    F-value 105 97 174 
adj    0.9340 0.9200 0.9250 
 
    Table 5-4 shows the comparison among three models: the final model, which is also the Model 
1 in Table 5-3; model without logarithm transformation on number of shareholders and 
institutional holdings; model without the percentage of tradable shares and institutional holdings. 
                                                          
14
 In the model without transformation, the ratio of number of shareholders and the ratio of institutional 
holdings are without logarithm. In the model without new variables, “trdpct” (ratio of tradable shares) and 
“lninshold” (ratio of institutional holdings) are not included in the model. 
15
 “nsh” is the ratio of number of shares outstanding. 
16
 “trdpct” is the ratio of tradable shares. 
17
 “lnshn” is the ratio of number of shareholders (in logarithm). 
18
 “lninshold” is the ratio of institutional holdings (in logarithm). 
19
 “shn” is the ratio of number of shareholders without transformation. 
20
 “inshold” is the ratio of institutional holdings without transformation. 
* is a 5% significance level 
** is a 10% significance level 
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From the comparison table we can see that the final model has the highest    which indicates 
that it is more significant than the other two models. Therefore, I keep the percentage of tradable 
shares and institutional holdings in the model. 
 
Table 5-5 Cross-sectional Regression (from 2001 to 2010) and Pooled Regression Results
21
 
 
apremium 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 All years 
volatility -5.6720 -0.1954 -2.5386 -6.7026* 0.8178 3.0469 4.8943 4.3637* 3.8275 1.4616 2.6284* 
turnover -0.0052 -0.0208 -0.0062 -0.0142 0.0135 0.0051 -0.0006 0.0103* -0.0014 0.0126* 0.0046* 
nsh22 -1.1170 -0.3849 -0.0391 0.2221 -0.7181** 0.1541 0.6355** 0.4138** -0.0990 -0.2911 0.3603* 
lnshn23 0.0054 -2.6596* -1.0801 -2.8845* -0.9439 -1.9779* -1.2961* -0.4797 -1.6404* -1.3848* -1.8452* 
lninshold24 0.0384 0.0735 0.1940 -0.1047 -0.1548 -0.0547 -0.1782 -0.1378 0.1330 -0.0809 -0.0606** 
trdpct25 -5.3727 -1.8609 3.3524 2.0287 0.1777 2.1725 2.2656 0.6955 
  
-2.3619* 
cons 26.6515* 18.4802* 13.4459* 10.156* 19.074* 7.0654** 3.0087 2.7098 -2.8697 16.9883 15.2664* 
adj    0.9629 0.9526 0.9500 0.8874 0.8792 0.8641 0.9091 0.9162 0.9331 0.9288* 0.9340* 
 
    Table 5-5 shows the final results. I further test the model year by year from 2001 to 2010 to 
identify the yearly difference and the consistency of the model. The results with significance 
levels are showed in Table 5-5. For the panel data model (the last column), its R square adjusted 
is 0.9339, indicating that the independent variables explain about 93% of the change in 
dependent variable. The p-value of the model as a whole is 0, which again shows that the model 
is significant as a whole and the independent variables in the regression well explained the 
dependent variable—“apremium”.  For the cross-sectional models year by year, the coefficients 
for “volatility”, “turnover”, “nsh” and “trdpct” are not consistent over years. The signs change 
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 The pooled regression result is in the last column named “All years”. 
22
 “nsh” is the ratio of number of shares outstanding. 
23
 “lnshn” is the ratio of number of shareholders (in logarithm). 
24
 “lninshold” is the ratio of institutional holdings (in logarithm). 
25
 “trdpct” is the ratio of tradable shares. 
* is a 5% significance level 
** is a 10% significant level 
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dramatically during the period of 2005 to 2008. And my explanation is the reform in 2005 that 
the Chinese government started to unblock nontradable shares had some influence on the free 
float, liquidity, volatility in the markets. 
 
5.2.2. Pooled Regression Results Analysis 
 
    (a) General factors 
    For the general variables, “volatility” is the ratio of volatility of A shares to B shares, and it 
represents the relative speculative activities between A-share and B-share markets. In the pooled 
regression model in Table 5-5, the coefficient of this variable is significantly positive. The result 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the greater the volatility of A shares relative to B shares, the 
higher the A-share prices relative to the B-share prices, and the higher the A-share premium will 
be. In other words, the excessive speculative activities in A-share market than B-share market is 
one of the factors that enlarge the price difference between the two markets. And this result 
supports the speculation argument by Sun and Tong (1999)—a higher of the volatility ratio of A 
shares over B shares will lead to a larger B-share discount. 
    The variable “turnover” is the ratio of turnover rates of A shares to B shares and it represents 
the relative liquidity of the two markets. The pooled regression result in Table 5-5 shows that the 
variable is significant in the model. The estimate of “turnover” is positive, which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that turnover rate ratio between A shares and B shares is positively 
correlated with A-share price premium or B-share price discount; the higher the turnover rate 
ratio of A-share over B-share is, the larger the price difference will be. Therefore, liquidity 
difference between the two markets is another factor that triggers the price difference. This result 
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supports the liquidity argument of Bailey (1994) and Sun and Tong (1999) that the relationship 
between A-share premium and relative market liquidity should be positive.  
 
    (b) Demand factors 
    For the possible factors for share supply and share demand, “nsh” and “lnshn” are ratio of 
number of shares outstanding and ratio of number of shareholders. For “nsh”, it has a positive 
coefficient and a p-value of 0.029 in the pooled regression results. It becomes insignificant with 
a significance level of 2.5% while it is significant with a significance level of 5%. However, the 
positive sign of the coefficient is unexpected. In the Sun and Tong (1999), they use the same 
variable—number of shares outstanding. And they get a negative relationship between the A-
share price premium and this variable, which is consistent to their hypothesis.  The positive sign 
in my model is interpreted as that when the number of shares outstanding in A-share market rises 
relative to B-share market A shares are getting more expensive than B-share counterparts.  It is 
against the demand theory in general. The unexpected results may be explained by “the greater 
fool” theory26—when the market is too optimistic, even though the stock price is really high, 
investors still believe that they can sell shares at a higher price to the “greater fools”. In this case, 
as the ratio of shares outstanding in A-share market relative to B-share market rises, the relative 
prices rises as well due to investors’ optimism in A-share market. 
    For “lnshn”—the ratio of number of shareholders in A-share market over B-share market—has 
a negative sign in the pooled regression results in Table 5-5, which is also unexpected and 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. As a variable of share demand, the more number of 
shareholders in A-share market relative to B-share market, the higher the A-share price premium 
                                                          
26
 The “greater fool theory” was first documented by William A. Sahlman and Howard H. Stevenson in 
their paper “Capital Market Myopia” (1985). 
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should be. The explanations to the unexpected result could be that the ratio of number of 
shareholders between A-share market and B-share market increases, the ratio of the shares 
demand between the two markets is not necessarily increases. In other words, even though the 
account numbers in A-share market increase faster than that in B-share market, the trading 
volumes in B-share market grow faster than the trading volumes in A-share market due to their 
different investor structures. 
    Another explanation could be that the demand elasticity of the two markets is different. If the 
demand curve of A shares are more elastic than that of B shares, the rise of share demand in A-
share market relative to B-share market can bring a decrease of A price premium. 
 
Figure 5-5 Explanation on Demand Elasticity 
 
    Figure 5-5 shows that a more elastic demand curve of A shares over B shares may result in a 
negative relationship between number of shareholders and A-share premium. In the graph, 
assuming that the demand curve of A shares are more elastic than that of B shares, the demand 
curve of A shares are drawn less steep than that of B shares. When there are more demand in A-
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share market relative to B-share market, the price increases more in B-share market over A-share 
market due to demand elasticity differences. 
 
Figure 5-6 The Coefficients of “nsh” (number of shares outstanding) in the Cross-sectional 
Regression Results 
 
    Figure 5-6 shows that the coefficients of “nsh” (number of share outstanding) are not 
consistent over years—the numbers go above and below zero. Therefore, another explanation to 
the unexpected sign of this variable is the average effect. More specifically, on average the sign 
is positive due to relatively larger negative numbers in certain years; however, the variable 
appears to be negative in a number of years. Thus, the relationship between “nsh” and 
“apremium” need to be further confirmed. 
 
     (c) Ownership structure factors 
    For the ownership structure variables, “trdpct” is the ratio of percentage of tradable shares in 
A-share market to B-share market. The pooled regression result shows that the coefficient of 
“trdpct” is negative with a p-value of 0.016.  “trdpct” is significant in the model and is negatively 
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related with “apremium”. The negative relationship between the ratio of tradable shares and A-
share price premium is consistent with the hypothesis that the more shares tradable in A-share 
market over B-share market, the more the share supply will be in A-share market relative to B-
share market, and the lower the A-share prices will be relative to B-share prices. 
    Another important factor of ownership structure is the institutional shares—“lninshold” is the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of institutional shares of A-share market over B-share market. In 
other words, it’s the relative shares held by institutional investors between A shares and B 
shares. In pooled regression the model in Table 5-5, it has a t-value of -1.84 and p-value of 
0.066, which is significant at a significance level of 10%. The negative sign of the coefficient 
indicates that the more institutional investors relatively in A-share market over B-share market, 
the smaller the A-share premium will be. And it is consistent with the hypothesis that 
institutional investors help to narrow the price difference.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
    The objective of this study is to examine how the ownership structure in China’s stock 
markets has affected the price gap between A-share and B-share markets. This thesis emphasizes 
the importance of the ownership structures in China on the price disequilibrium, especially, the 
individual-institutional structure and tradable-nontradable structure.  
    The overview of China’s stock markets shows that there is always a tremendous price gap 
between China’s A- and B-share markets; and B shares have been traded at discount relative to 
matching A shares. The general comparison shows that A-share market is much larger and more 
liquid than B-share market. By building up multi-regression models, the A-share premium can be 
explained by the ownership structure differences between the two markets. More specifically, the 
results show that in Chinese stock markets, institutional investors help to stabilize prices. As the 
number of institutional holdings in the A-share market rises relative to B-share market, the price 
difference between the two markets decreases. It indicates that institutional investors help in 
narrowing down the price gap between A shares and B shares and it may due to their advantage 
in knowledge, experience, information over individual investors.  
    Non-tradable and tradable shares structure is another important factor. Nontradable shares 
were created since the China’s stock markets first established in 1990s and took up about 20% of 
China’s stock markets. In the pooled regression model, the percentage of tradable shares has 
significant influence on the price differences. And the results show that when tradable shares in 
A-share market increase relatively to that in B-share market, the price gap decreases. In other 
words, more shares are tradable in the market, the closer the prices come to their true values. It 
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indicates that the existence of non-tradable shares limit the liquidity level of stock market. The 
result is consistent with the hypothesis. 
    Interestingly, the demand factors—“nsh” (number of shares outstanding) and “lnshn” (number 
of shareholders) have unexpected signs. The ratio of number of shares outstanding should be 
negatively related with A-share premium, however, the pooled regression result shows a positive 
sign. On the other hand, number of shareholders should have a positive relationship with A-share 
premium but I received a negative sign in the pooled regression result. Although the results can 
be explained by a number of reasons, further testing is needed to confirm the results. 
    The other factors like liquidity factor and speculation factor are explanatory to the 
phenomenon as expected. The results support previous studies on liquidity and speculation 
factors. 
    In this thesis, I also test the diversification value of B shares relative to the world market. The 
results show that B shares prices are highly correlated with Hong Kong stock prices and 
relatively less correlated with Taiwan stock prices. And the diversification benefit of B shares to 
the global market is not very significant. 
    Financial analysts and economists predict that in the long run the Chinese government will 
merge A-share and B-share markets, since QFII
27—the new tool for foreign investors to invest in 
Chinese stock market was created. However, the tremendous price differences between the two 
markets will make the process extremely difficult. Given the results of the influence of 
ownership structures on the price disequilibrium, the Chinese government should consider the 
following policies: (1) unlock more nontradable shares in A-share market; (2) invite more 
institutional investors into the markets. The above policies may drive the A-share price down and 
                                                          
27
 is a program that was launched in 2002 in China to allow licensed foreign investors to buy and sell "A" 
shares in China's mainland stock exchanges. 
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decrease the price difference between China’s A-share and B-share markets, and thus make the 
future mergence smooth and successful. 
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APPENDIX A: 85 CROSS-LISTING SHARES IN CHINA’S A-SHARE AND B-SHARE 
MARKETS 
 
Bloomberg Codes                   
A-share code 
 
B-share code 
 
A-share code 
 
B-share code 
000002 CH Equity 
 
200002 CH Equity 
 
600190 CH Equity 
 
900952 CH Equity 
000011 CH Equity 
 
200011 CH Equity 
 
600221 CH Equity 
 
900945 CH Equity 
000012 CH Equity 
 
200012 CH Equity 
 
600272 CH Equity 
 
900943 CH Equity 
000016 CH Equity 
 
200016 CH Equity 
 
600295 CH Equity 
 
900936 CH Equity 
000017 CH Equity 
 
200017 CH Equity 
 
600320 CH Equity 
 
900947 CH Equity 
000018 CH Equity 
 
200018 CH Equity 
 
600555 CH Equity 
 
900955 CH Equity 
000019 CH Equity 
 
200019 CH Equity 
 
600602 CH Equity 
 
900901 CH Equity 
000020 CH Equity 
 
200020 CH Equity 
 
600604 CH Equity 
 
900902 CH Equity 
000022 CH Equity 
 
200022 CH Equity 
 
600610 CH Equity 
 
900906 CH Equity 
000024 CH Equity 
 
200024 CH Equity 
 
600611 CH Equity 
 
900903 CH Equity 
000025 CH Equity 
 
200025 CH Equity 
 
600612 CH Equity 
 
900905 CH Equity 
000026 CH Equity 
 
200026 CH Equity 
 
600613 CH Equity 
 
900904 CH Equity 
000028 CH Equity 
 
200028 CH Equity 
 
600614 CH Equity 
 
900907 CH Equity 
000029 CH Equity 
 
200029 CH Equity 
 
600617 CH Equity 
 
900913 CH Equity 
000030 CH Equity 
 
200030 CH Equity 
 
600618 CH Equity 
 
900908 CH Equity 
000037 CH Equity 
 
200037 CH Equity 
 
600619 CH Equity 
 
900910 CH Equity 
000039 CH Equity 
 
200039 CH Equity 
 
600623 CH Equity 
 
900909 CH Equity 
000045 CH Equity 
 
200045 CH Equity 
 
600639 CH Equity 
 
900911 CH Equity 
000055 CH Equity 
 
200055 CH Equity 
 
600648 CH Equity 
 
900912 CH Equity 
000056 CH Equity 
 
200056 CH Equity 
 
600650 CH Equity 
 
900914 CH Equity 
000058 CH Equity 
 
200058 CH Equity 
 
600663 CH Equity 
 
900932 CH Equity 
000413 CH Equity 
 
200413 CH Equity 
 
600679 CH Equity 
 
900916 CH Equity 
000418 CH Equity 
 
200418 CH Equity 
 
600680 CH Equity 
 
900930 CH Equity 
000429 CH Equity 
 
200429 CH Equity 
 
600689 CH Equity 
 
900922 CH Equity 
000488 CH Equity 
 
200488 CH Equity 
 
600695 CH Equity 
 
900919 CH Equity 
000505 CH Equity 
 
200505 CH Equity 
 
600698 CH Equity 
 
900946 CH Equity 
000513 CH Equity 
 
200513 CH Equity 
 
600726 CH Equity 
 
900937 CH Equity 
000521 CH Equity 
 
200521 CH Equity 
 
600751 CH Equity 
 
900938 CH Equity 
000530 CH Equity 
 
200530 CH Equity 
 
600754 CH Equity 
 
900934 CH Equity 
000539 CH Equity 
 
200539 CH Equity 
 
600776 CH Equity 
 
900941 CH Equity 
000541 CH Equity 
 
200541 CH Equity 
 
600801 CH Equity 
 
900933 CH Equity 
000550 CH Equity 
 
200550 CH Equity 
 
600818 CH Equity 
 
900915 CH Equity 
000553 CH Equity 
 
200553 CH Equity 
 
600819 CH Equity 
 
900918 CH Equity 
000570 CH Equity 
 
200570 CH Equity 
 
600822 CH Equity 
 
900927 CH Equity 
000581 CH Equity 
 
200581 CH Equity 
 
600827 CH Equity 
 
900923 CH Equity 
000596 CH Equity 
 
200596 CH Equity 
 
600835 CH Equity 
 
900925 CH Equity 
000613 CH Equity 
 
200613 CH Equity 
 
600841 CH Equity 
 
900920 CH Equity 
000625 CH Equity 
 
200625 CH Equity 
 
600843 CH Equity 
 
900924 CH Equity 
000725 CH Equity 
 
200725 CH Equity 
 
600844 CH Equity 
 
900921 CH Equity 
000726 CH Equity 
 
200726 CH Equity 
 
600845 CH Equity 
 
900926 CH Equity 
000761 CH Equity 
 
200761 CH Equity 
 
600848 CH Equity 
 
900928 CH Equity 
000869 CH Equity 
 
200869 CH Equity 
 
600851 CH Equity 
 
900917 CH Equity 
600054 CH Equity   900942 CH Equity             
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APPENDIX B: OVERVIEW OF 85 CROSS-LISTING STOCKS 
 
A-share 
Code 
B-share 
Code Industry Date Full Shares 
Tradable 
Shares 
Listed in 
HK market 
C000002 200002 Real Estate 2001-12-31 121,755,136 121,755,136 N 
C000002 200002 Real Estate 2010-12-31 1,314,955,468 1,314,955,468 N 
C000011 200011 Real Estate 2001-12-31 61,459,312 61,459,312 N 
C000011 200011 Real Estate 2010-12-31 67,605,243 67,605,243 N 
C000012 200012 Metal, Nonmetal 2001-12-31 299,052,546 299,052,546 N 
C000012 200012 Metal, Nonmetal 2010-12-31 762,583,992 762,583,992 N 
C000016 200016 Electronic 2001-12-31 202,837,902 202,837,902 N 
C000016 200016 Electronic 2010-12-31 405,675,804 405,675,804 N 
C000017 200017 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 178,620,649 178,620,649 N 
C000017 200017 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 248,362,982 248,362,982 N 
C000018 200018 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2001-12-31 69,421,903 69,421,903 N 
C000018 200018 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2010-12-31 69,421,903 69,421,903 N 
C000019 200019 Food And Beverage 2001-12-31 26,136,000 26,136,000 N 
C000019 200019 Food And Beverage 2010-12-31 26,136,000 26,136,000 N 
C000020 200020 
Information Technology 
Industry 2001-12-31 101,995,836 101,995,836 N 
C000020 200020 
Information Technology 
Industry 2010-12-31 101,995,836 101,995,836 N 
C000022 200022 Transportation, Storage 2001-12-31 106,447,000 106,447,000 N 
C000022 200022 Transportation, Storage 2010-12-31 179,611,983 179,611,983 N 
C000024 200024 Transportation, Storage 2001-12-31 136,221,800 136,221,800 N 
C000024 200024 Real Estate 2010-12-31 141,633,850 141,633,850 N 
C000025 200025 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2001-12-31 26,400,000 26,400,000 N 
C000025 200025 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2010-12-31 26,400,000 26,400,000 N 
C000026 200026 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 58,320,000 58,320,000 N 
C000026 200026 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 58,320,000 58,320,000 N 
C000028 200028 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2001-12-31 54,885,600 54,885,600 N 
C000028 200028 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2010-12-31 54,885,600 54,885,600 N 
C000029 200029 Real Estate 2001-12-31 120,000,000 120,000,000 N 
C000029 200029 Real Estate 2010-12-31 120,000,000 120,000,000 N 
C000030 200030 
 
2001-12-31 39,600,000 39,600,000 N 
C000030 200030 Papermaking, Printing 2010-12-31 39,600,000 39,600,000 N 
C000037 200037 
Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water 2001-12-31 108,565,928 108,565,928 N 
C000037 200037 
Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water 2010-12-31 263,854,446 263,854,446 N 
C000039 200039 Metal, Nonmetal 2001-12-31 142,403,801 142,403,801 N 
C000039 200039 Metal, Nonmetal 2010-12-31 1,430,478,709 1,430,478,709 N 
C000045 200045 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2001-12-31 33,000,000 33,000,000 N 
C000045 200045 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2010-12-31 49,500,000 49,500,000 N 
C000055 200055 Metal, Nonmetal 2001-12-31 145,368,000 145,368,000 N 
C000055 200055 Metal, Nonmetal 2010-12-31 223,967,460 223,967,460 N 
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C000056 200056 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2001-12-31 72,000,000 72,000,000 N 
C000056 200056 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2010-12-31 101,688,192 101,688,192 N 
C000058 200058 Electronic 2001-12-31 228,041,727 228,041,727 N 
C000058 200058 Electronic 2010-12-31 246,461,318 246,461,318 N 
C000413 200413 Electronic 2001-12-31 100,000,000 100,000,000 N 
C000413 200413 Electronic 2010-12-31 100,000,000 100,000,000 N 
C000418 200418 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 127,357,248 127,357,248 N 
C000418 200418 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 160,184,158 160,184,158 N 
C000429 200429 Transportation, Storage 2001-12-31 303,750,000 303,750,000 N 
C000429 200429 Transportation, Storage 2010-12-31 348,750,000 348,750,000 N 
C000488 200488 Papermaking, Printing 2001-12-31 206,480,550 206,480,550 N 
C000488 200488 Papermaking, Printing 2010-12-31 557,497,485 557,497,485 Y 
C000505 200505 Real Estate 2001-12-31 57,500,000 57,500,000 N 
C000505 200505 Real Estate 2010-12-31 64,975,000 64,975,000 N 
C000513 200513 Medicine, Biologic Products 2001-12-31 122,306,984 122,306,984 N 
C000513 200513 Medicine, Biologic Products 2010-12-31 111,993,354 111,993,354 N 
C000521 200521 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 113,100,000 113,100,000 N 
C000521 200521 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 113,100,000 113,100,000 N 
C000530 200530 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 115,000,000 115,000,000 N 
C000530 200530 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 115,000,000 115,000,000 N 
C000539 200539 
Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water 2001-12-31 665,340,000 665,340,000 N 
C000539 200539 
Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water 2010-12-31 665,326,500 665,326,500 N 
C000541 200541 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 82,500,000 82,500,000 N 
C000541 200541 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 225,225,000 225,225,000 N 
C000550 200550 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 344,000,000 344,000,000 N 
C000550 200550 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 344,000,000 344,000,000 N 
C000553 200553 
Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastic 2001-12-31 115,000,000 115,000,000 N 
C600602 900901 Electronic 2010-12-31 293,370,465 293,370,465 N 
C600604 900902 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 232,925,000 232,925,000 N 
C600604 900902 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 232,925,000 232,925,000 N 
C600611 900903 Social Services 2001-12-31 202,800,000 202,800,000 N 
C600611 900903 Social Services 2010-12-31 533,871,000 533,871,000 N 
C600613 900904 Transmitting, Culture Industry 2001-12-31 45,626,375 45,626,375 N 
C600613 900904 Social Services 2010-12-31 45,626,375 45,626,375 N 
C600612 900905 
 
2001-12-31 120,051,360 120,051,360 N 
C600612 900905 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2010-12-31 132,056,496 132,056,496 N 
C600610 900906 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 120,120,000 120,120,000 N 
C600610 900906 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 120,120,000 120,120,000 N 
C600614 900907 
Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastic 2001-12-31 41,745,000 41,745,000 N 
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C600614 900907 Real Estate 2010-12-31 120,643,050 120,643,050 N 
C600618 900908 
Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastic 2001-12-31 406,560,000 406,560,000 N 
C600618 900908 
Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastic 2010-12-31 406,560,000 406,560,000 N 
C600623 900909 
Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastic 2001-12-31 243,100,000 243,100,000 N 
C600623 900909 
Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastic 2010-12-31 243,100,000 243,100,000 N 
C600619 900910 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 179,400,000 179,400,000 N 
C600619 900910 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 284,169,608 284,169,608 N 
C600639 900911 Real Estate 2001-12-31 204,490,000 204,490,000 N 
C600639 900911 Real Estate 2010-12-31 272,176,190 272,176,190 N 
C600648 900912 Real Estate 2001-12-31 200,557,500 200,557,500 N 
C600648 900912 Real Estate 2010-12-31 200,557,500 200,557,500 N 
C600617 900913 
Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastic 2001-12-31 64,558,440 64,558,440 N 
C600617 900913 Real Estate 2010-12-31 64,558,440 64,558,440 N 
C600650 900914 Social Services 2001-12-31 146,409,120 146,409,120 N 
C600650 900914 Transportation, Storage 2010-12-31 161,050,032 161,050,032 N 
C600818 900915 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 69,000,000 69,000,000 N 
C600818 900915 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 75,900,000 75,900,000 N 
C600679 900916 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 132,000,000 132,000,000 N 
C600679 900916 Real Estate 2010-12-31 171,600,000 171,600,000 N 
C600851 900917 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2001-12-31 167,773,761 167,773,761 N 
C600851 900917 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2010-12-31 468,850,582 468,850,582 N 
C600819 900918 Metal, Nonmetal 2001-12-31 125,000,000 125,000,000 N 
C600819 900918 Metal, Nonmetal 2010-12-31 187,500,002 187,500,002 N 
C600695 900919 Food And Beverage 2001-12-31 346,732,848 346,732,848 N 
C600695 900919 Integrated 2010-12-31 346,732,848 346,732,848 N 
C600841 900920 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 217,000,000 217,000,000 N 
C600841 900920 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 217,000,000 217,000,000 N 
C600844 900921 Papermaking, Printing 2001-12-31 96,896,677 96,896,677 N 
C600844 900921 
Petroleum, Chemical, Rubber, 
Plastic 2010-12-31 193,793,606 193,793,606 N 
C600689 900922 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2001-12-31 48,787,200 48,787,200 N 
C600689 900922 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2010-12-31 48,787,200 48,787,200 N 
C600827 900923 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2001-12-31 107,078,400 107,078,400 N 
C600827 900923 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2010-12-31 179,718,197 179,718,197 N 
C600843 900924 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 97,500,000 97,500,000 N 
C600843 900924 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 243,943,750 243,943,750 N 
C600835 900925 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 113,760,000 113,760,000 N 
C600835 900925 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 216,235,008 216,235,008 N 
C600845 900926 
Information Technology 
Industry 2001-12-31 88,000,000 88,000,000 N 
C600845 900926 Information Technology 2010-12-31 88,000,000 88,000,000 N 
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Industry 
C600822 900927 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2001-12-31 66,550,000 66,550,000 N 
C600822 900927 Wholesale And Retail Trades 2010-12-31 99,825,006 99,825,006 N 
C600848 900928 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 107,145,500 107,145,500 N 
C600848 900928 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 107,145,500 107,145,500 N 
C600680 900930 
Information Technology 
Industry 2001-12-31 124,800,000 124,800,000 N 
C600680 900930 
Information Technology 
Industry 2010-12-31 124,800,000 124,800,000 N 
C600663 900932 Real Estate 2001-12-31 509,600,000 509,600,000 N 
C600663 900932 Real Estate 2010-12-31 509,600,000 509,600,000 N 
C600801 900933 Metal, Nonmetal 2001-12-31 164,000,000 164,000,000 N 
C600801 900933 Metal, Nonmetal 2010-12-31 78,238,700 78,238,700 N 
C600754 900934 Social Services 2001-12-31 156,000,000 156,000,000 N 
C600754 900934 Social Services 2010-12-31 156,000,000 156,000,000 N 
C600295 900936 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2001-12-31 210,000,000 210,000,000 N 
C600295 900936 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2010-12-31 420,000,000 420,000,000 N 
C600726 900937 
Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water 2001-12-31 432,000,000 432,000,000 N 
C600726 900937 
Production & Supply Of 
Power, Gas & Water 2010-12-31 432,000,002 432,000,002 N 
C600751 900938 Transportation, Storage 2001-12-31 180,000,000 180,000,000 N 
C600751 900938 Transportation, Storage 2010-12-31 180,000,000 180,000,000 N 
C600776 900941 
Information Technology 
Industry 2001-12-31 150,000,000 150,000,000 N 
C600776 900941 
Information Technology 
Industry 2010-12-31 300,000,000 300,000,000 N 
C600054 900942 Social Services 2001-12-31 104,000,000 104,000,000 N 
C600054 900942 Social Services 2010-12-31 156,000,000 156,000,000 N 
C600272 900943 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2001-12-31 80,000,000 80,000,000 N 
C600272 900943 Integrated 2010-12-31 80,000,000 80,000,000 N 
C600221 900945 Transportation, Storage 2001-12-31 76,680,000 76,680,000 N 
C600221 900945 Transportation, Storage 2010-12-31 184,723,201 184,723,201 N 
C600698 900946 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 230,000,000 230,000,000 N 
C600698 900946 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 230,000,000 230,000,000 N 
C600320 900947 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2001-12-31 110,000,000 110,000,000 N 
C600320 900947 
Machinery, Equipment, 
Instrument 2010-12-31 858,000,000 858,000,000 N 
C600190 900952 Transportation, Storage 2001-12-31 166,500,000 166,500,000 N 
C600190 900952 Transportation, Storage 2010-12-31 222,806,970 222,806,970 N 
C600555 900955 Textile, Clothing, Fur 2001-12-31 110,000,000 110,000,000 N 
C600555 900955 Social Services 2010-12-31 330,000,000 330,000,000 N 
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APPENDIX C: DATA MANUAL 
 
Tradable Shares-Tradable A Shares  
A_Trdshr  Tradable A Shares Num. 
Lstatrdshr Listed A Trade Shares 
Num. 
  
Mngshr  Managing Shares Num. 
Strgplashr  Strategic Investor Placing 
Num. 
  
Lpplashr  Legal Person Placing 
Num. 
  
Fundplashr  Fund Placing 
Num. 
  
Nlstsni 
Non Listed Seasoned New 
Issue 
Num. 
  
Nlstrigoff Non Listed Right Offering 
Num. 
  
Othtrdshr Other Tradable Shares 
Num. 
  
Resashr Restricted A Shares 
Num. 
  
Tradable Shares-Tradable B Shares  
B_Trdshr  Tradable B Shares Num. 
Lstbtrdshr Listed B Trade Shares 
Num. 
  
Resbshr Restricted B Shares 
Num. 
  
Institutional Investors Holding Shares 
InsHoldB 
Institutional Investors 
Holding of A Shares 
Share 
InsHoldB 
Institutional Investors 
Holding of B Shares 
Share 
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APPENDIX D: POOLED REGRESSION RESULTS BY STATA 11.1 
 . 
                                                                              
       _cons     15.26641   1.941542     7.86   0.000     11.45268    19.08014
         yr9     .4317438   .3159405     1.37   0.172    -.1888514    1.052339
         yr8    -1.033118   .3456276    -2.99   0.003    -1.712027    -.354209
         yr7    -1.356546   .3903065    -3.48   0.001    -2.123216    -.589875
         yr6    -.9263141   .3687758    -2.51   0.012    -1.650693   -.2019356
         yr5    -.1660362    .515399    -0.32   0.747    -1.178423     .846351
         yr4     .9486112   .5430595     1.75   0.081     -.118109    2.015331
         yr3     .2227564   .5967875     0.37   0.709    -.9495005    1.395013
         yr2     1.374446   .6371756     2.16   0.031     .1228553    2.626036
         yr1    -.5658251   .7881934    -0.72   0.473    -2.114057    .9824065
   industry7     1.490854   1.686766     0.88   0.377    -1.822424    4.804133
   industry6    -6.870039   2.423447    -2.83   0.005    -11.63037   -2.109713
   industry5    -5.534858   1.564689    -3.54   0.000    -8.608344   -2.461373
   industry4    (omitted)
   industry3    -6.933069   2.607835    -2.66   0.008    -12.05558   -1.810553
   industry2     6.085561   2.371186     2.57   0.011     1.427891    10.74323
   industry1    -7.385926   2.874427    -2.57   0.010     -13.0321   -1.739749
         v89     -5.00035   2.045151    -2.44   0.015    -9.017597   -.9831026
         v88    -8.117948   2.249703    -3.61   0.000    -12.53699   -3.698904
         v87     4.251695   2.687171     1.58   0.114    -1.026657    9.530048
         v86    -8.801402   2.355164    -3.74   0.000     -13.4276   -4.175204
         v85    -3.717911   1.976884    -1.88   0.061    -7.601061    .1652392
         v84    (omitted)
         v83    -11.44212   2.044184    -5.60   0.000    -15.45747   -7.426776
         v82    -6.768866   1.038329    -6.52   0.000    -8.808433   -4.729299
         v81    -3.443804   1.158838    -2.97   0.003    -5.720086   -1.167522
         v80    -8.256789   2.068031    -3.99   0.000    -12.31898     -4.1946
         v79    -5.148703   2.032089    -2.53   0.012    -9.140293   -1.157114
         v78    (omitted)
         v77     3.414049   2.567456     1.33   0.184    -1.629151    8.457248
         v76     .9142255   .9204769     0.99   0.321    -.8938478    2.722299
         v75    (omitted)
         v74     1.497612    2.21698     0.68   0.500    -2.857154    5.852378
         v73    (omitted)
         v72    -7.111975   2.743308    -2.59   0.010     -12.5006   -1.723354
         v71    -11.69158   2.152546    -5.43   0.000    -15.91978   -7.463375
         v70     6.926246   2.625396     2.64   0.009     1.769237    12.08326
         v69    -5.081045   2.359917    -2.15   0.032     -9.71658   -.4455103
         v68    -3.174814   1.452653    -2.19   0.029    -6.028229   -.3213995
         v67    -.0107486    .898023    -0.01   0.990    -1.774716    1.753219
         v66    (omitted)
         v65    -2.778742   1.551909    -1.79   0.074    -5.827125    .2696402
         v64    (omitted)
         v63    -8.942002   1.978871    -4.52   0.000    -12.82906   -5.054947
         v62    -7.465228   1.958631    -3.81   0.000    -11.31252   -3.617931
         v61    -6.767512   2.351259    -2.88   0.004    -11.38604   -2.148984
         v60    (omitted)
         v59    (omitted)
         v58    (omitted)
         v57    (omitted)
         v56    -6.663536   2.723477    -2.45   0.015     -12.0132   -1.313867
         v55     -3.34279   2.354727    -1.42   0.156    -7.968129     1.28255
         v54    -9.226446   2.177996    -4.24   0.000    -13.50464   -4.948255
         v53    -13.12507     2.2217    -5.91   0.000    -17.48911   -8.761037
         v52    (omitted)
         v51    (omitted)
         v50    -10.97198   2.180724    -5.03   0.000    -15.25553   -6.688428
         v49    (omitted)
         v48     .0727092   2.045702     0.04   0.972    -3.945621    4.091039
         v47     2.036377   .8505295     2.39   0.017     .3657005    3.707054
         v46    -12.33982   2.935319    -4.20   0.000    -18.10561    -6.57404
         v45    -13.53598   3.441528    -3.93   0.000    -20.29611   -6.775864
         v44     -12.6509    3.07316    -4.12   0.000    -18.68744   -6.614354
         v43    -11.65529   2.940298    -3.96   0.000    -17.43086   -5.879728
         v42    -11.36802   3.006283    -3.78   0.000    -17.27319   -5.462839
         v41     .8899187   2.579214     0.35   0.730    -4.176376    5.956213
         v40    -15.05591   3.415965    -4.41   0.000    -21.76581      -8.346
         v39    -10.04835    3.61124    -2.78   0.006    -17.14183   -2.954865
         v38    -11.00843   3.001736    -3.67   0.000    -16.90468   -5.112186
         v37    -10.96346   3.068352    -3.57   0.000    -16.99056   -4.936364
         v36    -11.27764   2.966272    -3.80   0.000    -17.10423   -5.451058
         v35    (omitted)
         v34    -.0043118   1.002964    -0.00   0.997    -1.974412    1.965789
         v33    -11.18614   3.013654    -3.71   0.000     -17.1058   -5.266488
         v32    -12.18724   3.140754    -3.88   0.000    -18.35655   -6.017921
         v31    -12.28482   2.945717    -4.17   0.000    -18.07102   -6.498607
         v30    -6.797738   2.805991    -2.42   0.016    -12.30949    -1.28599
         v29    -11.65727   2.989256    -3.90   0.000    -17.52901   -5.785543
         v28    (omitted)
         v27    -11.94658   2.975456    -4.02   0.000     -17.7912   -6.101952
         v26    -12.60565   2.967459    -4.25   0.000    -18.43457   -6.776732
         v25    -11.72237   3.005265    -3.90   0.000    -17.62555   -5.819193
         v24    (omitted)
         v23    -11.10342    2.99401    -3.71   0.000    -16.98449   -5.222352
         v22    -12.44853   3.098558    -4.02   0.000    -18.53496   -6.362093
         v21    -9.604871   3.045944    -3.15   0.002    -15.58795   -3.621788
         v20    (omitted)
         v19    (omitted)
         v18    -8.468416   2.926977    -2.89   0.004    -14.21781   -2.719018
         v17    -8.541078   2.540917    -3.36   0.001    -13.53215    -3.55001
         v16    -13.86817    2.92224    -4.75   0.000    -19.60827   -8.128077
         v15    -6.700642   2.728732    -2.46   0.014    -12.06063   -1.340651
         v14     1.981522   .9788374     2.02   0.043     .0588126    3.904232
         v13     .5726135   .8200094     0.70   0.485    -1.038113     2.18334
         v12    (omitted)
         v11    -13.17028   3.054522    -4.31   0.000    -19.17021   -7.170347
         v10    -11.97254    2.97907    -4.02   0.000    -17.82427   -6.120818
          v9    (omitted)
          v8    -9.087762   3.130478    -2.90   0.004    -15.23689   -2.938631
          v7    -13.06825   2.901389    -4.50   0.000    -18.76739   -7.369115
          v6     -8.19566   2.738891    -2.99   0.003    -13.57561   -2.815715
          v5    -2.583701   2.781364    -0.93   0.353    -8.047075    2.879673
   exchange2    (omitted)
   exchange1     -8.96349   2.065159    -4.34   0.000    -13.02004   -4.906943
lninsholda~b    -.0606309   .0329222    -1.84   0.066    -.1252992    .0040374
  lnashnbshn    -1.845219   .2532582    -7.29   0.000    -2.342689   -1.347749
      trdpct    -2.361983   .8495885    -2.78   0.006    -4.030812   -.6931547
    nshratio     .3603135   .1649885     2.18   0.029     .0362302    .6843969
turnoverra~o     .0046736   .0013372     3.50   0.001     .0020469    .0073002
volatility~o     2.628454   .7470656     3.52   0.000     1.161009    4.095899
                                                                              
    apremium        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    34484.2064   638  54.0504802           Root MSE      =  1.8903
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9339
    Residual    1968.83728   551  3.57320741           R-squared     =  0.9429
       Model    32515.3691    87  373.739875           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 87,   551) =  104.60
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     639
note: industry4 omitted because of collinearity
note: v84 omitted because of collinearity
note: v78 omitted because of collinearity
note: v75 omitted because of collinearity
note: v73 omitted because of collinearity
note: v66 omitted because of collinearity
note: v64 omitted because of collinearity
note: v60 omitted because of collinearity
note: v59 omitted because of collinearity
note: v58 omitted because of collinearity
note: v57 omitted because of collinearity
note: v52 omitted because of collinearity
note: v51 omitted because of collinearity
note: v49 omitted because of collinearity
note: v35 omitted because of collinearity
note: v28 omitted because of collinearity
note: v24 omitted because of collinearity
note: v20 omitted because of collinearity
note: v19 omitted because of collinearity
note: v12 omitted because of collinearity
note: v9 omitted because of collinearity
note: exchange2 omitted because of collinearity
>  yr7 yr8 yr9
> ry2 industry3 industry4 industry5 industry6 industry7 yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6
>  v75 v76 v77 v78 v79 v80 v81 v82 v83 v84 v85 v86 v87 v88 v89 industry1 indust
> 5 v56 v57 v58 v59 v60 v61 v62 v63 v64 v65 v66 v67 v68 v69 v70 v71 v72 v73 v74
> 36 v37 v38 v39 v40 v41 v42 v43 v44 v45 v46 v47 v48 v49 v50 v51 v52 v53 v54 v5
> v17 v18 v19 v20 v21 v22 v23 v24 v25 v26 v27 v28 v29 v30 v31 v32 v33 v34 v35 v
> holdainsholdb exchange1 exchange2 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16 
. reg apremium  volatilityratio turnoverratio nshratio  trdpct lnashnbshn lnins
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